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'l~lll; t'Ot.t'I~IC,.~L ECONOI`tY Of' OVF,RVALUA'I'ION'
Frederirk van der Plurg
i`fus~ uf thc litcraturc on political busincss cyclcs (c.l;. Nurdhaus, ry7~;
~Iac Rac, i(~77; v:tn dcr Plocg, ty8.}) assumCti that thc incumbcnt political
I,ari} attcn,pts tu sccwc rc-clcctiun, by rnaximising thc cxpcctcd numbcr of
~utcs cast in its Gn~uur at the I~,rlhcoming election, and to expluit lags due to
adaptive expectations. "I~he government can then fi~ol the electorate by
jueliciuusly depressing output in the early part of its terrn in ofTice, in order tu
li,rcc du~.n the cxpcctcd ratc of in(lation, and to crcate a boum, without tuo
n,any advcrse inflationary consequences, towards election eve in order to gain
thc s}~mpathy of thc clcctoratc. Such political busincss cyclcs rcly un a naivc
rlecturate and cannot occur in New Classical economies with market clearing
and r.itiunal expectatiuns, because then the electorate would see through the
guvcriuncnt's vote-maximising strategy (e.g. McCallum, ry78; Minford and
I'eel, iy8.z). [f the private sector has rational expectations and prices or wages
are sticky, this is observationally equivalent to adaptive expectations and
(Icxiblc prices and wages (e.g. Sargent, ry76) but ncvcrthclcss the clcctoratc
wuuld scc through a vote-maximising stratcgy and thus no political busincss
cycle would occur.
ln any case, it is nut clcar that the empirical evidence supports this vicw of
the political business cycle (e.g. Frey, t978). One reason for this is that it may
not hc rralistic to assume that output can be changed instantaneously whilst
inflatiun can, through expectations, oniy be iniiuenced in a gradual fachinn. In
an open economy it is much easier and faster to affect real income and
cunsumers' prices through the exchange rate than it is to have an e(Tect on
a~;gregate demand, output and employmenL An appreciation of the exchange
rate immediately cuts import prices and consumers' prices and therelore
immediatcly boosts real income. Thís, combined with the reduction in the rcal
valuc of irnports, dcpresses aggregate dcmand, but ovcr time standard
ncorlassical substitution efTects ensure that the volume ofexports decrcases, the
vulume of imporls decreases and therefore aggregate demand and output
increase. 'I'he above argument is based on the J-curve effect in the balance of
trade, for which there is ample empirical evidence (e.g. Diaz-Alejandro, rgGG;
Ala~ec, tJ73). 'fhis note explores the implications of the f-curve efTect for lhe
pulitical business cycle in a small open economy, as suggested by van der Ploeg
(,~~I4.}) and Uornbusch (ry87, Scction tv). Scction I scts up thc modcl of thc
ccunumy. Seciiun I I dcrives the development of the exchange rate, real inconre
and uutput over the course of the political business cycle. Section I I I coucludes
~~ itli an intcrprctatiun and qualificatiun of lhe resulls.
''fhr au~hur is grarrful io an associate rJitor aud an anunymuus rcfrrtt for Ihrir uxful cummenrs.
f as~ 1
~'SEPT. IOi}OIPOLITICAL ECONOMY OF OVEttVALUA'I'ION
1. A MuUF:L UF A SMALL UPEN ECONOMY WIT11 A~-CUNVE
11'c will assumc a vcry simple macrocconomic modcl:
y-(Stfr~(fi-~y-i'e)-fe(p~`-~e-p),BJar~~-ji1 jtlu,ryC t (I)
~ - ~(p'-fe-p-c), ~ ~ u (1)
pr - (I -a) pfa(p'-Fe),o e a e I (3)
p-~-w Í4)
whcre y, c, p, p', e, pe, and u~ denote real output, a competitivcncss indcx, the
hume price Icvcl, the forrign price Ievel, the nominal exchange rate (the pricc
uf une unit of foreign exchange), the consumers' price index ancl the numinal
wagr, respectivcly. All Variables are expressed as logarithmic deviations Gum
thcir equilibrium valucs. "I'here is imperfect substitutiun between hume and
forcign goods. Each country is wholly specialiscd in the production of its
expurtable. There is nominal wage rigidity, so that employment and output are
cletennincd by aggregate demand. Equation (1) gives aggregate demand as an
increasing fwrctiun of competitiveness and real income and a decreasing
functiun of thc real exchange rate. In the short run an appreciation Of the real
exchanSc rate increases real income, reduces the value of imports, and theretixe
incrcasrs aggregate demand. Equation (2) gives the~-curve and shuws that thc
vulume uf net cxports falls gradually after an appreciation of thc rcal cxchauge
rate. It is assumed that an appreciatiun of the rcal exchange rate rcducrs lung-
run aggcgate demand, so that something stronger than the I~farshall-Lerner
cundition (8 ~~i) is assumed (8 ~ a~t~). For simplicity, it is assumcd that
aggregate dcmand does not depend on the real interest rate.f Equation (g)
gives an expression for the consumers' price index as a weighted average uf
home and foreign prices, which holds exactly for Cobb-llouglas preferrnces.
Equation (4) shows that prices are a constant mark-up on wages and that therc
is nominal wage rigidity. For simplicity, we assume that w- p'. 'llfe rcduced
form then bccurnes:
y-Sc-~ie,8-a~(t-rl) ~fe- (arlffi)~(1-r~) ~o
c - r[i(e-c),c(o) - co.
(5)
(b)
7~he exchangr rate, e, will be treated as an intermediate policy instrument,
whicó is ultimatcly dclcrmincd by monctary and fiscal policy.
I1. TIIE POLITICAL BUSINESS CVCLE
It is assumed that the incurnbent political party chouses its cxchan~;c rate
pulicy tu nfaximise vutes on election eve. When popularity is an incrcasin};
~ Ih~Giically iudwrJ .wings m a s~nall uPeu nunumy wi~h real ex~h'rngr reir usrieb~N~uuK .wd a Irnn
s~ru.~urr uf iutei~.s~ ~rtrs, bu~ wiihuu~ a J-eurvr, arc Jiuusxd in vrn drr 1'lucg (~yl3~).
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funrtiun uf thc uutcomcs uf output (or cmploymcnt) and thc rcal conswncrs'
~~.r~c ~~crr thc clcctiun cyclc, thc prublcm of the govcrnrncnt is:
`Iax J T{yls)-i(Í[w(s)-p~(s)-~JZ)cxp(P.r)ds, p,Ó,c~1o0 (7)
~~lrc~rc ll,c,,,p and T dcnote thc rclativc wcight the incumbent govcrnment
.rttaches to real incorne vis-à ois real activity, the desired level uf real income,
tlrc r:uc uf rncniury luss of the clectorate and the Iength of an clection period,
respcctively. 'I~he parameter p is a backward-looking ( rathcr than a forward-
luukins;) ratc ufdiscount and corresponds to the rate at which past performance
is firr~i~ttcn. It is assumcd that pc r~i. ' I~hc rcduccd-form dccision problcm of
lhc incunibcnt political party is:
(' T
A4ax J {c5r.(s) -~ee(s) - 2~[e(s) -i]Y} exp ( ps) ds, 0- OaZ ~ o, (8)
r o
subjcct to (6), whcre é- - r,~~a G o denotes the desired value of the nominal
cxchange rate.
"I'he first-order conditions for the government are:
aH~ac - - lc-B(c-i) f:[ix - o (9)
z - -px-(aH~dc) - (S(r-p)z-8,x(T) - o (to)
and (6), where the Hamiltonian is defined as H- dc-lu--0(e-i)'fxl(r(e-c)
ancl x dcnotes the shadowprice associated with competitiveness. When we solve
(q) for x and substitute the result into ( to), one obtains
~- [(~-P)~~][fcf~(c-i)]-(a~~e),c(T) -i-(filt7). (rt)
Backward intcgration of (tt) yields
e(t)-i-(fc~~)f[a'G~(1G-P)9]{t-exP[(~-P)(l-T)]}. (t~)
Upon substitution of (t2) into (6) and forward integration, one obtains
c(t) - co cxp ( - r~it) ~- {i- (fi~~) } [a~~(~-P) ~]} [t -exp ( -1~t)]
[~Z~~(21G-P)(1~-P)B]eXP[(1~-P)(t-T)]{t-exP[-(21U-P)T)}- (t3)
The political business cycle settles down to an equilibrium cycle, because the
stahilitv condition is satisfted:
o G c7c[(kf t)T]~àc(kT) - exp(-r~rT) G t,k - o, t,s,... (t4)
1'he equilibrium ( or stationary) political business cycle satisfies
co - c(T) - i-(N-~P)f[a~~(1G-P)p] (t -[~~(11G-P)]
{t-exP[-(2~-P)T)}[t-cxP(-'I`T)]-r) (t5)
so th:rt ( t 3) bccomcs
r(t) - é- (I~~O) f LatGI (~-P)P) ( t-[~I (2~-P)]
{fexp(-t~i!)~-cxP[(rG-P) (t-T)]i) (t3~)


















Fig. (. 1'olitical businea cycle in a small olxn economy.
oc I'-{t-exp[-(~-P)T]]I[t-exP(-~T)] ~ 1.
Substitution of (ts) and (t3') into (5 ) gives
9(1) - (a-f~) [~- ( f'~~) f a4~~(2i~-P) ~]
fN[arG~(4~-P) P] eXP [(i~-P) (l- T)J
-[~1~Z~(iL-P) (2~-P)P]{C'exp(-I(il)fexP[(4~-P) (l-T)]}. (tG)
Finally, in(lation in the consumers' price index is given by
h~([) - ai(t) - -(aa~~~) eXP [(1~-P) (t- T)] 5 0. (17)
Pig. 1 presents the time paths ofthe exchange rate, competitiveness, output and
in(lation during the course of two election periuds. 'hhe exchange ratc
munotunically appreciates during the length of each electiun periud and on
rlectiun morning there is ajump depreciation of the exchange rate. "1'he~-curve
is driven hy cumpetitiveness, c, which in the early part of the election periud
(o e l e 7") improvrs and in the laucr part of the elcction periud ( 7" c 1 c 7')
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..-urscns.' Sincc in the early part of the election pcriod (o e l G 7")
ctm,l,ctiti.cncss impruves and the exchange rate appreciates, it is clear that
buth thc .~uluntc uf nct cxpurts and thc valuc of nct cxports incrcase as well
:rs rral incuntc iucrcascs. }Icnce, in thc carly part of thc clcction pcríod output
:tncl cmplu~ mcnt incrcasc. In fact, output continucs to int rcasc for at Icast part
uf thc~ timc uf thc sccuncl part of the clcction pcriud (as y(T') --~~P(7") 1 0).
l t,..:trcls clcctiun c.c uulput can dccrcasc (scc (a)) or incrcasc (sce (h)), which
clt~pt ncls c,n
~i('~-! - ~i,sy~,~n)-(tr~~G~l(~~G-n)n]{t-[~f'~(~G-n)leXp(-~GT)} (t~)
Ix~ins; nc~;ati~c ur positive, respcctivcly. Ilence, output is more likcly tu
elc~c rcase al~tcr a graclual increase (case (a)) when the election period is long,
wlicn thc ratc af mcmory loss is high and when thc impact clTect of the
exchangc rate un output, fe, is small and of competitiveness on output, d, is
larl;e. Since the exchange rate depreciates on election morning, real income,
nct exports and there(~rre output fall at that time (y(o) e y( T)). [nflation in the
cunsumcrs' pricc indcx gradually falls ovcr thc clcction period and on clcction
ntcnning in(latiun jumps upwards.
II1. CONCLUDING REMARKS
"1'he incumbent political party chooses its exchange rate policy to secure re-
clcctiun, i.e. to maximise votes at the forthcoming election.' Popularity at the
polls depends on the government's track record on achieving high Ievels of
output and real consumers' wages. An appreciation of the exchange rate
immediately cuts inflation, raises the value in domestic prices of net exports and
thcrefore boosts real income and aggregate demand, but it takes time for the
ncoclassical substitution effects to build up and therefore in the long run nci
exports deleriorate and output falls. The consequences of this f-curve effect in
the balance of trade for the political business cycle are as follows. Immediately
upon cntering ofTice a government depreciates the exchange rate, which can be
vicwcd as an `investment' in improving competitiveness, and subsequently it
Gradually appreciates the exchange rate. A policy of real appreciation towards
elcction eve is very sensible from a political point of view, because it quickly
cuts in(lation, boosts real income and therefore increases votes, whilst the
undesirable e(Tects on net exports, output and employment are typically felt
aftcr the election. Dornbusch (tg87) already suggested that a policy of
overvaluation of the exchange rate is one of the best tricks in the bag and that
r'fhc turn-over orcun halfway through the dection period when there is no memory lou ( T' s T for
p- o). When there is memory loss, il occun Itss than halfway through tht dection pcriod (T' e~T for
p 1 0).
' 1Vhen Rovcrnmcnts are Icss myopic, they maximise tht uninterrupled length in office (Frty and Ramser,
,q86~. 1Vhrn tht dectorate ha no memory, this leads to a social wdfart optimum with the dixount rate
equal tn ,ht probability of not bcing rrdected. A government sure of rrtlettion dtxs not value tht currcnt
clcrliun morr Ihan futurc elections and thus punuts a goldrn rult of indiRrrence betwern generatiom (p -
n, r(t~-~t(d-p)~B). AlthouRh such far-siRhled txhaviour may be rcalistic fitt the Swiss systcm of
rrfcrcnda, it ducs nut secm a rtalistic ftature of most SVes,crn demucracies.
I J~3)~ POLITICAL ECONOMY OF OVERVALUATION
it gasc short-tcrm pulitical support li)r Yinochet in Chilc, 111artincz dc Hoz in
:~rr;rnlina, ~I~hatchcr in thc Unitcd 1{ingdom and Kea~an in thc ~fnitcd Statcs.
In cunu~ast to prcviuus vicws of the political busincss cyclc, it is pussihlc (ur
output tu (itll just bcfore elcction eve. ~I~Ire magniludc of this pc)litiral l,usinc~ti
r~~cle (dy'i~(yr-p)(1), i.e. the extent to which the government is prepared tu
ovcrvaluc tltc cxchangc ratc, incrcascs whcn thc rclativc wci};ht thc clcctcu-:ttc
attaches tu the rr.rl consurners' wage uis-à-ois output (0) is small, when the
clectorate's r:rte uf mcmory loss (p) is h;gh, when the advcrse eHi~cts uf
overvalualion on net cxports and aggregate demand take longer to comc
throus;h (i.e. 1(i is small), and when theJ-curve e(i~ect (d) is large. In Ihe extrenfc
case when there is complete memory loss (p-~ oo) or noJ-curve ellèct (yi - o),
the political business cycle disappears. However, the empiriarl eviclence
suggests that political business cycles based on overvaluation of the exchangc
rate as election eve approaches are an important feature of 1Nestern
dcmocracies.
~~n appreciation of the real exchange rate improves Ihe current account in
the shurt run, as the increase in real income Ieads to an incrcase in savings out
uf a given Icvcl of producers' income (the Harberger-Laurscn- Metzler e(Tcct),
and deteriorates the current account in the long run, as the volume of net
exports responds to the real exchange rate. Hence, if the electorate also cares
al~uut tlte current account (or the increase in the nation's net wealth), thc
~;ovcnfinent has an added incentive to overvalue the exchange rate towards
clcction cvc.
"I'i[hur,l; Unir~ersily
Un[e of receipl affina! typescripl: February rgflg
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ELFC'f ION OUTCO~IFS AND THE STOCKMARKET
Frcderick van dcr PLOEG'
('rnrLR, lrlhur,c C~nirersirt, SpppLE TilhurR, The Nenc~rlands
A m;rcroeconomic model with sluggish labour markets and elTicienl financial markets is
f~,nnulateJ The conseyuences of uncertainty about eleclion outcornes for share prices, interest
r;ucs, owput and employmenl in Ihe pre-election period are analysed.
Also, Ihe nature of the jumps in the slockmarket and the real economy on the morning after
the elcctiun are analysed. This provides an alternative lo the conventional theory of polilical
husinrss cycles and is ahle lo explain large swings in the economy when election 'news' becomes
known. It is shown that thc stockmarket crashcs ( booms) when a Labour adminislration is
clecteJ into ofLce wilh the promise that it will engage in a fiscal ( monetary) expansion.
1. Introduction
The conventional literature on political business cycles [e.g., Nordhaus
(1975); titcRae (1977); van der Ploeg (1984)] rejects the view of a government
as a benevolent dictator interested in maximising social welfare. Instead, the
incumbcnt politicaÍ party is interested iri ii~ short-rur. surviL'a: and atlempts
to secure re-election by maximising the expected number of votes cast in its
favour on election eve. Implicit is lhe hypothesis lhat votes on election eve
depend on the track-record on economie performance over the last period of
governmcnt [e.g., Hibbs (1982); Borooah and van der Ploeg (1983)]. In doing
tliis the government attempts to maximise votes by exploiting lags due to
a(iaptive expectations. Hence, the government fools the electorate by judi-
ciously depressing outpul in the early part of its lerm in oflice, in order to
force down the expected rate of inflation, and by engineering a boom,
without too many adverse consequences for in0ation, towards election eve
and thereby gains the sympathy of the electorate. Such political business
cycles rely on a myopic electorate and are not feasible under rational
expectalions [MeCallum (1978); Minford and Peel (1982)], because then the
elcctorate would see through the government's vote-maximising strategy.
Iluwevcr, it is quite possible for governments to exploit other lags in the
economy in ordcr to obtain shorl-run political gains. For example, in open
`The author is gratcful to the referees for Iheir conslructive comments.
It176 '6RQi89;S3.íp ~r ~ 19R9, Elsevicr Science Publishers B.V. INorth-Hulland)
" F. uan Jer Plorg, Elecnun outcon~es unJ the stockmarl,rt
ecunumy macruccunomics the 1-curve is a well-established phenomenon. It
mcans that an appreciation of the currency Icads to an immediate rcductiun
in imporl and consumcrs' prices and therefore to an immediate boost in real
income whilst the adverse effccts on the volume of nct exports, aggrcgatc
demand and employment only occur after some time. This then givcs thc
incumbcnt political party an incentive to appreciate lhe currency, buost real
income and gain popularity towards election eve and lumber the next
administration with the adverse consequences for net exports and unemploy-
ment [Dornbusch (1987); van der Ploeg (1987b)J. However, political business
cycles of the type discussed above may disappear when governments are
subjected to continuous elections (perhaps, as in the Swiss system of
referendums) and are interested in long-run survival and maximise the
expected length in office. In that case, there are no cycles and a social welfare
optimwn is rcached with the social rate of discount equal to the probability
of not being re-elected [Frey and Ramser (1976)].
It is quite clear that the conventional view of the political business cycle is
somewhat naive as it is not concerned with the effects of uncertuinty about
future political outcomes on the current state of the economy. The reason for
this is that the conventional view assumes that the private sector is
backward-looking and does not anticipate future events. This is a big
shortcoming, because large jumps in asset prices (i.e., share prices, consol
priccs and exchange rates) often occur on the morning after the election once
the vutes have been counted. The following story mighl explain what might
occur. Imagine a situation with an incumbent Conservalive political party
and suppose there is a probability that at the next election this adminis-
lraliun is replaccd by a Labour party which promises a greater emphasis on
jub crealion and expansion of public expenditure programmes when elected
into uffice. The anticipation of a possible fiscal expansion can have dramatic
conscyuences for the pre-election outcomes of the economy. For example, the
anticipation of future budget deficits and higher short-term interest rates
implies a rise in the current long-run rea) interest rate and an apprcciation of
tlie currency. Hence, the anticipation of a fiscal expansion aggravates the
recession caused by a Conservative administration in the pre-election period.
This may Icad thc incumbcnt Conservative party to 'colour' its idcology and
implemcnt a more rctlationary package than in the absence of the possibility
of such a political take-over [van der Ploeg (1987a)]. Because the election
outcome is not known until all votes have been counted, on the morning
aftcr the election the economy jumps onto a new trajectory in order to take
account of the election 'news'. It is clear therefore that future political
unccrtainty, combincd with forward-looking bchaviour of the privatc scctor,
ccin causc majur swings in thc stalc of thc economy. Hcncc, ratiunal
expectations and diseyuilibrium in labour markets enhance the scupe for
pulitical-ccunumic interactions.
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~f hc uhjcctive uf this paper is to discuss the nature uf such political-
ccunumic Iluctuatiuns and, in particular, to analyse the ef(ects of election
uutcumrs on thc sluckmarket and the real economy. Section 2 descríbes a
r;rtiun:rl cxpcctatiuns modcl with sluggish output and labour markcts and
c(licicnt financial markets. The implementation and announcement effects
and thc subscyucnt devclopment of the economy caused by a surprise fiscal
and munctary cxpansion arc discussed in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the
swings in the economy caused by pre-announced expansions and by political
unccrtainty. In particular, the conscquences of having a possible future
Kcynesian administration, cornmitted to either a fiscal or a monetary
cxp;rnsion, installcd at the next election, and the effects of the probability of
rc-clcctiun are discussed. Scction 5 concludes the paper.
2. Sluggish labour ntarkets and efficient financial markets
A Kcynesian model of a closed economy with an efficient stockmarket will
bc uscd. (t can bc summarised by:
}~-xytf. ar?0 (I)
,n-p-ky--i.-ti, k,:!?o (2)
~- r,~-d~( }~- ~~)-~y, os~~k,t
y''td-i-p"-r
d-1~(}~-y), OSyc l, whcre
}- - logarithm of rcal oulput (dcmand)
i~ - lugarithm of thc full-employmcnt level of real output (-0)
~ fiscal shock
d- dividcnd ratio (ratio of profits to the value of lhe stockmarket)
p- logarithm of the price Ievel
x~ - lugarithm uf the nominal wage rale
i - numinal intcrest rate
r rcal intcrest ratc
q lugarithm of thc valuc of the stockmarkct
nr - lugarithm uf thc nominal supply of money.
All variables are expressed as devialiuns from their eyuilibrium Icvels. The
mu~lrl is rclatcd tu thc one discusscd by 131anchard ( 19231). [An intcrtcmpural
cl:~s,ir:rl full-cmploymcnt modcl of saving and invcstmcnt can bc found in
Ahcl and Blanch:ud (1`)83)].
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Ey. ( I) is a rcduced form of the IS-curve and shows that the dcmand for
goods incrcases when the stockmarket booms and when the government
engages in a fiscal ezpansion (e.g., increase in government spending or cut in
tazes). The stockmarket inlluences aggregate demand through the demand
for invcstment goods and through the elTect of wealth on consumption. Eq.
(2) is the Lllf-curve for money market equilibrium. The dcmand fur moncy
depcnds positively upon real income and ncgalivcly upon the opportunity
cost of holding real muney balances (i.e., the nominal interest rate). There is
no commercial banking system, so that m corresponds to high-powered
rnuney. As far as aggregate supply is concerned, eq. (3) shows that firms set
prices as a mark-up on wages and that workers press for higher wagcs whcn
tlie reserve army of unemployed is small. Efficient and risk-neutral arbitrage
in financial markets ensures that (4) holds, that is arbitrage cuntinues until
tlic rcal rcturn on bonds equals the real return on stocks and shares wherc
thc lattcr consists of dividends (d) and capital gains (q`). Finally, eq. (5)
shows that the ratio of dividends (or profits) to the value of the stockmarket
is an increasing function of the ratio of output to the value of the
stockmarket. It is derived under the assumption that profits are a proportion
of total incumc and y refcrs to the long-run ratio of profits to the valuc uf
tlie stockmarket. Stockprices are forward-lookíng variables, which depend
upun rational expectations of future events. This can be seen from forward
intcgration of (4) and (5) (and imposing the appropriate transversality
condition):
q(r)- f [d(s)-r(s)]ds- J(y~{s)-r(s))exp(-y(s-r))ds, (6)
~ ~
which gives stockprices as the discounted stream of future dividends.'
Thc reduced form can be expressed in terms of the policy instruments, j
and rn, thc backward-looking state variable, p, and the forward-looking state
variablc, q: (I),
i- i.(k(aq fj) -m f p) (7)
r - k~(a9 fI) - .i(m - p) (g)
d- -y(I -a)qfyJ (9)
P - w - ~(a9 fj) and (10)
q`- -.i(m-p)fÍk'-Y)Ít(k'ai-y(1 -a))q, (I I)
'Ahernalively, Q(r) - J;"D(s)exp[-J;r(.c'ld.c'Jds where Q-exp(q) and D-Qd.
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Fig. I. Phasc diagram for the stockmarket and the real economy.
where k'-k~-!j5 is assumed to be positive.
3. Effects of an unanticipated fiscal and monetary expansion
The steady state of lhe system (7)~11) is given by y~(oo)-y-0, r(oo)-
15 !XJ !XJ -U, OU~- a, l W i w~-U~w~-- frù áird ..l....l-.r r! I~ )-yl ) 9( 1 - í ( )- Í--1 t f-'Ylr v~wi-~ ~ t'rr
a~l)~. Hence, in the long run there is no inllation and output is at its natural
rate. A fiscal expansion leads in the long run to a rise in prices, a rise in the
interest rate and dividend ratio, and a fall in the stockmarket. A monetary
expansion is super-neutral, i.e. has no effect on real outcomes in the long run,
and leads to a one-for-one rise in the price level.
The transient dynamics associated with (10)-{11) corresponds to saddle-
point behaviour, because the determinant of the associated Jacobian, - rba~i,
is negativc and therefore thcre is an unstable eigenvalue associated wíth the
forward-looking variable, q, and a stable eigenvalue, associated with the
backward-looking variable, p-w. The phase diagram associated with (10)-
(II) is presentcd in fig. I and confirms the saddlepoint property of this
perfcct-foresight systcm.
Consider an unanticipated, permanent fiscal expansion. In the long run
this raises prices and lowers the valuc of the stockmarket, so that the steady
slate moves from f:' to F.. The expectation of falling prices and rising real
intcrest rates Icads to an immediate fall in the value of the stockmarket
de~pite the risc in the dividend ratio. The associated fall in consumption and
invcstmcnt Icads to partial crowding out of the fiscal cxpansion, so that
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aggrcgate demand and employment rise on impact. Aftcrwards, the stock-
m.rrkct continucs to fall and priccs slale rising which chokc ofT lhc initi:rl
inrrcasc in output. On impact the dividcnd ratio jumps up and aftcrwanls
continucs to risc to its ncw cquilibrium Icvcl. Sincc thcrc are capital losscs on
the stockmarket, thc real intcrest rate remains below the dividcnd r:rlio.
Now consider an unanticipatcd, pcrmancnt monctary cxpansiun. In thc
long run this shifts the economy from F." to E, so that prices rise une-for-onc
whilst thc stockmarkct is unaffccted. On impact thc cxpcctation of highcr
profits Ie:rds to an increase in the value of the stockmarkct and an incrcasc
in output and cmploymcnL Aftcrwards, thc rise in priccs and dcclinc in thc
valuc of thc stockmarkct choke ofi thc ínitial gains in output until
cyuilibrium is reached.
4. Effects of uncertainly about election outcomes on the economy
Assumc that an incumbcnt Conscrvativc administration at time 0 is facing an
clcction in T pcriods where the rival Labour administration promises to
engagc in a monetary expansion, say m(t-~T)-m~~0, t?0 (sce fig. 2). Lct n
bc thc probability that the Conservative party gcts re-elcctcd and I-n be
the probability that the Labour party gets into otTice. In that case the private
scctor anticipates a monetary expansion with expected value equal to
0 ~ m` -( I- n)m~ ~ m~. On impact the economy moves from the Conscrvative
stcady statc, E~, to A, so that the value of the stockmarkct, thc interest rate,
output, employment and in(lation increase as soon as the private sector
anticipatcs the probability of a Labour take-over. in the run-up to the
election stockprices, output, employment and intlation continue to rise. The
rise in prices reduces the interest rate whilst the rise in income incrcases the
intcrest rate. On election eve the economy has moved to B; the time it takes
to travcrse the distance from A to B is exactly equal to the Icngth of the prc-
clection period. On election morning the votes are counted and the new
government resumes oRce. If the Conservative government is re-elected,
there is no change in monetary policy yet the stockmarket crashes instan-
taneously and output, employment and in0ation fall immcdiately (move from
B to C). Afterwards, the increase in unemployment exerts a downward
pressure on wages and prices. This boosts the real supply of money, reduces
thc interest rate and boosts profits, stockprices, output and employment until
the Conservative equilibrium, E~, is reached again. On the other hand if the
Labour party secures the next term in o(fce, there is a jump increase in the
rnoncy supply as well as an instantaneous boom in the stockmarket, output
and employment ( move from B to D). The subsequent increase in prices Icads
to falls in thc interest rate and the stockmarket, which choke o(T output and
cmploymcnt.
Thc result that thc stockmarkct crashcs (booms) whcn thc Conscrvativc
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Flg. 2. Uncertainty about a tuwre monetary expansion.
( Labuur) party emergcs as the victor is perhaps not what one would expect.
Huwevcr, most prospective Labour governments promise to deliver a fiscal
rathcr than a monetary expansion (see fig. 3). As soon as the prospect of a
future Labour government becomes a possibility, the stockmarket crashes
and uncmployment increases (move from E~ to A). In the run-up to the
rl~~r-tinn thc ctockmarket, output and employment continue lo fall so that
wagcs and prices fall (move from A to B). Hence, an anticipated fiscal
cxpansion causes unemployment in the interim period. On the morning after
the election, the 'news' of the election outcome causes a discrete jump in lhe
stockmarket. lf the Conservative party is re-elected, there is no fiscal
expansion, the stockmarket immcdiately booms and therefore there is an
instantancous recovery in output leading to employment (move from B to C).
As a result of the over-hcating of the economy, prices and wages start rising.
The subscyucnt falls in the stockmarket after the election choke off output
and cmpluymcnt until the old equilibrium is reached (move from C to E~).
On lhe other hand, if the Labour party is elected, there is a fiscal expansion
and an immediate crash of the stockmarkct (move from 8 to D). Dcspite
some crowding out of private investment and consumption, there is a
recovery Ieading to over-employment so that prices and wages increase after
thc clection. The continuing falls in the stockmarket choke off output and
cmploymcnt unlil the ncw eyuilibrium is reached (move from D lo E~).
It i. yuilc clcar from thcsc two cxamplcs lhat uncertainty about clcction
outcumcs (:an cause majur swings in asset prices and therefore in the real
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Fig. 3. Uncertainty about a future fiscal expansion.
economy. The jumps in the stockmarket depend of course on the anticipated
probability of re-election, a. When this probability is high and the Conserva-
tive party is actually re-elected, the jump in the stockmarket on election
morning is small as there is not much of a surprise. On the other hand, if the
Labour party is elected, this is a big surprise and therefore there is a large
jump in the stockmarket on election morning. Also, the elTect on the pre-
election outcomes is larger when the probability of re-election is lower.
5. Concluding remarks
A simple macrceconomic model with perfect foresight, an efficient stock-
market and sluggish labour markets has been formulated. In the long run a
monetary expansion is neutral and has no real effects; it simply leads to a
one-for-one increase in the price level. On impact the stockmarket rises, so
that output and employment rise. Subsequently, the rise in prices and fall in
the stockmarket choke off the initial gains in output until equilibrium is
reached. A fiscal expansion dces not alTect output and employment in the
long run, because it is completely crowded out by a fall in the slockmarket,
an increase in prices and wages and an increase in interest rates. On impact
the stockmarket falls and output rises. Subsequently, the rise in prices and
continued fall in stockprices choke o(f the initial gains in output and
employmcnt.
WI)en there is political uncertainty in the sense that an incumbent
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('unscn:ttive party may be replaced by a Labour party at the next election,
this ~eill afTect the pre-clectiun outcomes and cause major swings in thc
sturkmarkct un clc~tion morning. Whcn thc prospcctivc Labour governmcnt
h:!s a tn:!nifcsto which promiscs a monetary expansion, thc stockmarket,
rrices and output rise in the run-up to the election. [f the Conscrvative
(Labour) party gcls elected, then the stockmarket crashes ( booms) on
rlcrtion morning with a resulting fall (increase) in output and employment.
Aftcnvards, prices and wages fall (increase) whilst output and employment
incrc:!se ( fall). Whcn the prospective Labour administration has a manifesto
which promises a fiscal expansion, there will be falls in the stockmarket and
a reccssion in thc run-up to the election. [f the Conservative ( Labour) party
gets re-clccted, then the stockmarket booms (crashes) on election morning. In
buth cases output and employment increase.
Future rescarch may be concerned with the e(fects of these political-
ecanomic swings in the stockmarket and the real economy on the policies of
the incumbcnt government and on the manifesto of the opposition parties.
For examplc, when there is a threat of a new Labour government which
prumises a fiscal expansion, then in the light of the recession in the run-up to
the electiun an incumbent Conservative administration may engage in laxer
fitical policy than in the absence of such a threat. In other words, the
idcology of the incumbent government may be ' coloured' by the ideology of
a rival opposition party. A related area of research is to investigate the
policies and reputations of rival parties as a repeated game [as is done in
Alesina {1987)]. Alternatively, one could allow for polilical business cycles
driven by temporary informational asymmetries where one finds that incum-
be;; p~rties chcat Icast when either privatP !nform3!!on ic extrerrtely favour-
able or extrcmely unfavourable ( Rogoff, 1988). Finally, an important area of
future rese:trch is the political economy associated with the international
coordination uf economic policies. For example, international policy coordi-
nation may be counter-productive as the domestic political-economic distor-
tion in budget deficits is increased under international policy coordination
(T:!bcllini, 1988).
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